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Causes, Origins and Possible Effects of the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) 
 
Pawel Pasierbiak    Maria Curie Sklodowska University 
Abstract 
In 2007, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at its 13th summit 
decided to create the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). In assumptions, the 
common market was to be established by the end of 2015, and the introduction of free 
movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labor was to lead to an increase in the 
degree of market integration among member states. But the creation of a single market is 
not an easy process, as illustrated by the case of the European Community/European 
Union, where a process of single market creation has been implemented slowly and with 
numerous difficulties. On the other hand, if the process of a common market creation is 
successful, the integration brings benefits to the participating countries. The primary 
goal of this article is to indicate potential effects as well as to show the progress of the 
implementation and functioning of the common market in the ASEAN Economic 
Community. To achieve the objective, the author will analyze the theoretical implications 
of a common market and the real implications, taking the European Union as an 
example. Having done this part of the analysis, the author will try to indicate and 
evaluate the possible effects of the process of the common market creation in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
Key words: ASEAN Economic Community, regional economic integration, the 
European Union, Southeast Asia 
 
Introduction 
 Regional economic integration is 
one of the most important processes in the 
contemporary global economy. Together 
with globalization, it is a significant 
tendency at the current stage of 
international economic relations 
development. The processes of regional 
economic integration take place in 
virtually all geographic areas, while their 
scope, scale, and intensity vary due to the 
chosen model of integration. 
 In Asia, the regional economic 
integration is taking place, even though it 
has different characteristics from those in 
Europe. While in Europe, these processes 
are rather institutional and instrumental, 
in Asia, they are mainly bottom-up market 
processes, developing between individual 
traders. Although regional integration in 
Asia is principally motivated by economic 
factors, there are also some institutional 
initiatives. If one were to take into account 
intraregional initiatives only in Asia, the 
ASEAN should be put in the center. 
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ASEAN is the most advanced East Asian 
regional grouping, seeking to pursue 
higher levels of economic integration.  
 One such initiative is the 
construction of an internal market, which 
would be a higher form of market 
integration. In 2007, ASEAN member 
states formally decided to roll out the 
establishment of the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) by the end of 2015. 
Free movement of goods, services, capital 
and skilled labor, would constitute a 
significant step towards improving the 
economic competitiveness of the group.  
 The primary goal of this article is 
to indicate potential effects as well as to 
show the progress of the implementation 
and functioning of the common market in 
the AEC. To achieve the objective, the 
author will analyze the theoretical 
implications of a common market and the 
real implications by taking the European 
Union as an example. Having done this 
part of the analysis, the author will try to 
indicate and evaluate the possible effects 
of the process of the common market 
creation in ASEAN. 
 To achieve the goal, the author 
predominantly used a critical review of 
the literature and the descriptive method. 
Furthermore, to a limited extent, statistical 
data analysis was used. 
Regional economic integration in theory 
 The concept of regional economic 
integration has many definitions. The first 
of them were presented in the 1950s, but 
today the term continues to be newly 
defined vigorously. The very meaning of 
the term 'economic integration' infers a 
spectrum of definition and depends on the 
individual approach of the author. It is all 
about the presentation of the essence of 
integration, what elements are considered 
the most relevant, and whether the 
definitions present all or only selected 
elements (Mucha-Leszko, 2012, pp. 16). 
These elements are: reasons, purpose, 
scope of integration, mechanisms of the 
functioning, model, the creation of 
common institutions and the creation of 
new international order. Thus, one can 
expect the definition of regional 
integration to vary from narrow to wide. 
 In the 1950s a definition was 
presented by J. Tinbergen (1954, pp. 95) as 
'creation of the most desirable structure of 
the international economy, removing 
artificial hindrances to the optimal 
operation and introducing deliberately all 
desirable elements of coordination or 
unification.' This definition has been 
criticized as having too many evaluative 
terms, sometimes vague and ambiguous. 
Another definition, now recognized as a 
classic, was proposed by B. Balassa (1961). 
According to him, economic integration 
means the abolition of discrimination 
within an area. The author suggested that 
economic integration should be 
approached in static and dynamic 
manners. In the static approach, 
integration can be represented by the 
absence of various forms of discrimination 
between national economies. In the latter, 
integration encompasses measures 
designed to abolish discrimination 
between economic units belonging to 
different national states. B. Balassa 
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claimed that regional economic 
integration is carried out in stages, taking 
several successive and increasingly 
sophisticated forms (free-trade area 
through customs union, common market, 
economic union up to complete economic 
integration). In the 1960s, the wide 
definition of international economic 
integration was presented by Z. Kamecki 
(1967, pp. 93–94) as the 'formation, based 
on the developed single economic 
structure, of an economic organism 
comprising a group of countries, the 
organism which – due to the high degree 
of internal economic links and resulting 
from this internal economic cohesion – can 
be distinguished in a visible manner from 
the whole world economy.’ 
 As mentioned, definitions of 
regional economic integration are also 
formulated today such as presented by 
P. Robson (1998, pp. 1), for whom 
international economic integration should 
be defined as the institutional combination 
of separate national economies into larger 
economic blocs or communities. This 
definition includes only one aspect of 
regional economic integration called 
regionalism. Regionalism means a 
planned, top-down process of integrating 
various economies in the same 
geographical area, due to the signing of 
trade agreements and/or economic 
cooperation. The second aspect of regional 
economic integration is called 
regionalization, which is formed by the 
intensification of economic 
interdependence on a regional scale, but 
resulting from bottom-up (market) 
development of trade, capital, financial or 
production ties (Misala, 2005, pp. 434–
435). In this case, we are dealing with the 
real component of integration (de facto 
integration). This distinction between de 
jure and de facto integration is essential 
from the point of view of the processes 
taking place in Asia as opposed to those in 
Europe. While in Asia economically 
driven integration dominates, in the case 
of Europe the process is more politically 
driven. 
 Theoretical analysis of regional 
economic integration would not be 
complete without a presentation of the 
benefits resulting from an accession to the 
grouping. In theory, authors try to 
identify the benefits and the costs of 
accession in various forms of integration. 
It should be noted, however, that joining 
the regional grouping realizes not only 
economic but also political and social 
objectives. Therefore, it is quite hard to 
find a quantitative measure of the ultimate 
combined effect of joining the grouping 
(Mucha-Leszko, 2012, pp. 17). In the short-
term, benefits arise mainly from the 
increase in trade, but in the long run, they 
rely on the growth of production, factors 
of production productivity, GDP and GDP 
per capita growth. 
 J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya 
(1996, pp. 82) believe that the theories of 
international integration passed through 
two phases of their development, each 
reflecting the current priorities of the 
different policy concerns. The first group 
of theories, so-called traditional ones, 
explains the possible benefits of 
integration and presents a static approach. 
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On the other hand, the second group, 
taking into account the changing trade 
and economic environment, presents a 
dynamic approach to an analysis of 
economic integration. 
 The standard (traditional) 
economics of preferential trade 
agreements is founded on the work of 
Jacob Viner who introduced two basic 
effects arising from the establishment of a 
free trade area or customs union: trade 
creation effect and trade diversion effect 
(Hosny, 2013, pp. 134). According to J. 
Viner countries will be willing to take 
regional integration in the form of a 
customs union when this action creates 
more static benefits than losses. In other 
words, the trade creation effect outweighs 
the effect of trade diversion. 
 The second group of theoretical 
concepts explaining the benefits of 
regional integration takes into account the 
dynamic effects of the process. These 
effects include economies-of-scale, 
technological change, the impact on 
market structure and competition, 
productivity growth, risk and uncertainty, 
and investment activity (Hosny, 2013, pp. 
139). Since small markets increase costs, 
reduce the intensity of productive 
specialization, limit competition and 
weaken the tendency to technological 
progress, countries will likely seek to 
remove these disadvantages through the 
integration processes. 
 The selected theoretical concepts of 
regional integration presented above can 
be applied to real existing integration 
groupings, indicating effects of the 
cooperation between member states. This 
issue will be partly a subject of further 
analysis of this study. 
Benefits of common market – a case of 
the European Union 
 The European Economic 
Community/European Union has 
gradually implemented the stages of 
market and monetary integration. 
Achieving the common market proceeded 
in stages, and the process has not always 
been smooth. The first stage was a 
formation of a customs union on 1 July 
1968 (Watts, 2008, pp. 22) concerning 
trade in goods; however, agricultural 
products were still protected. Other 
freedoms (movement of services and 
factors of production), except for foreign 
direct investment, were not immediately 
provided. B. Eichengreen and T. Bayoumi 
estimated the effects of integration in the 
economic area. They found that the 
internal turnover within the EEC-6 as a 
result of the customs union creation 
increased faster by three percentage points 
on average (Mucha-Leszko, 2012, pp. 32). 
At the same time, the trade increase 
stimulated GDP growth by 3.1 percentage 
points per year. At the same time in the 
1960s, the share of intra-trade within the 
group increased from 35% to 49%, which 
is a clear manifestation of the growing 
integration of the EEC. 
 In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
integration of markets of member states 
faced severe difficulties. Even regressive 
tendencies were observed. The economic 
slowdown, rising unemployment and 
weakening international competitiveness, 
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particularly in high technologies, as well 
as existing barriers to internal trade 
limited opportunities to benefit from 
integration. In order to overcome the 
above difficulties, the decision to create a 
genuine single market by the end of 1992 
was made (Eichengreen, 2008, pp. 337). In 
1985, the White Paper on Completing the 
Internal Market was published, which 
spelled out a program and a timetable for 
unifying European markets. The White 
Paper proposed an abolishing by the 
member states all remaining barriers to 
the free circulation of goods, services, 
persons and capital (European 
Commission, 1996, pp. 1). Elimination of 
internal barriers as a consequence of the 
Single European Market (SEM) was to 
lead to better resource allocation by 
improving comparative advantage and 
specialization. Also, it was expected to 
increase efficiency in many sectors, as the 
effect of the rationalization of the 
production resulting from greater use of 
economies of scale. In 1996 the European 
Commission presented a report on the 
overall effectiveness of measures taken so 
that the Single European Market could be 
created. The Commission (1996, pp. 1–11) 
analyzed the period of 1985-1995 and 
presented its assessment of the effects of 
the Single European Market: 
1. The share of intraregional imports of 
industrial products increased by 6.7 
p. p., from 61.2% (1985) up to 67.9% 
(1995). The share of intra-EU imports 
of services increased from 46.9 to 50%. 
2. The impact of the SEM on foreign 
direct investment was higher than on 
trade – in the early 1990s, the EU was a 
destination for 44.4% of the global FDI 
inflow, while in the period 1982-1987 
the share was 28.2%. Moreover, in the 
period from 1984 to 1992 intra-EU 
investments grew four times faster 
than intra-trade. 
3. The share of intra-industry trade in the 
total exchange was increasing. In the 
years 1985-1992, it rose from 35 to 42% 
for products of different price and 
quality. 
4. As a result of the SEM, there has been 
an increase in the GDP, which, 
depending on the model used, ranged 
from 1.1 to 1.5 percentage points. The 
main reasons for this increase were the 
increase in competition/efficiency and 
the rise in the total factor productivity 
(TFP), each accounting for around half 
of the overall effect. 
5. Increased efficiency and competition 
resulting from the implementation of 
the SEM were made possible primarily 
due to the significant restructuring of 
European industries. In the period of 
1985-1993, the reduction of costs 
associated with the size of the 
company resulted mainly from 
achieving greater economies of scale. 
6. Implementation of the SMP has had a 
significant positive effect on the 
degree of competition in 
manufacturing sectors. The data on the 
reduction of the margin between costs 
and prices confirm this phenomenon. 
7. Changes in the structure and degree of 
competition in the market, resulting 
from the implementation of the SMP 
resulted in increasing price 
convergence in the EU between 1985 
and1995.  
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8. Estimates of the impact of the SMP on 
employment showed a positive 
relationship. Depending on the model, 
the introduction of SMP resulted in an 
increase of employment by 300 000 up 
to 900 000. 
9. The introduction of the Single 
European Market Project has brought 
real convergence among some 
member countries. The statistical 
analysis confirms that Ireland, 
Portugal, and Spain showed higher 
average economic growth rates after 
1987, which proves the effect resulting 
from the implementation of SEM. 
The analysis of the various areas of 
benefits creation was carried out mainly 
for the European Union, but it could be 
used as well to analyze other integration 
groupings organized on the principle of 
the common market. The liberalization of 
economic flows deals with the free 
movement of goods, services, and factors 
of production. An openness of markets 
and increased competition, as well as an 
increase in the size of the market, internal 
trade and improving the allocation 
efficiency of labor and capital, are the 
tangible benefits of the common market. 
As a result, gains from liberalization of the 
movement of goods, services, capital, and 
labor make up for the effects of the 
accumulation of the common market, 
namely GDP and income growth, 
increased economic and competitive 
strength of the region. There are also 
several mechanisms by which the 
common market also helps to improve the 
economic strength and competitiveness of 
the whole group in the world economy. It 
is because of more intense competition, 
which leads to higher efficiency and 
greater attractiveness of the internal 
market for foreign investors.  
 The benefits mentioned above can 
be achievable by the ASEAN Economic 
Community. At the same time, it must be 
emphasized that AEC is not a typical 
common market according to B. Balassa's 
classification. Although it includes its 
essential elements, such as the freedom of 
movement of goods, services, capital, and 
people, this freedom is not full. AEC 
implements the ‘common market minus’ 
integration, which means that areas or 
sectors that are excluded from 
liberalization are still covered by joint 
actions (Soesastro, 2005, pp. 29). 
Additionally, the case of AEC is so 
interesting that it remains an attempt to 
move from the free trade area to the 
common market, bypassing the phase of 
the customs union.  
Reasons behind the AEC creation 
Economic cooperation between 
ASEAN member states intensified in the 
early 1990s, with the entry into force of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). 
Other initiatives undertaken (including 
those on investment, or services) 
contributed to an increase of the 
integration level, but member states have 
concluded that the creation of a 
qualitatively new initiative will bring 
additional benefits. In addition to the 
benefits, there were also some risks, which 
could have been avoided by the AEC 
creation. Several primary reasons for the 
formation of the AEC can be identified.  
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 First is a need to remain 
competitive in an increasingly growing 
global competition (Austria, 2012, pp. 
142). The growing importance of China 
and India, increased the interest of the 
member states to achieve benefits from a 
larger and more integrated internal 
market (Sakane, 2018, pp. 12). The broader 
and more cohesive market, the higher are 
the possibilities of achieving economies of 
scale in operations, which increases the 
attractiveness of the ASEAN internal 
market (ADB, 2008, pp. 86). Reduction of 
transaction costs, the progressive 
unification of the rules of origin 
requirements, improving infrastructure 
and logistics under conditions of global 
and regional value chains mean that the 
integrated market is easier to operate.  
 Second, the global trend towards 
regionalism has reinforced the need for 
more intensive economic integration. 
ASEAN had to start seeking investors and 
compete for their export markets much 
more actively. 
 Third, ASEAN must continue to 
maintain its credibility as the integration 
hub for FTA activities in East Asia 
(Austria, 2012, pp. 144). 
 Fourth, the implementation of 
increasingly sophisticated market 
integration would prevent excessive 
individual approaches to agreements by 
member states. This is a serious issue that 
has been called "noodle bowl syndrome." 
The creation of the AEC seeks to prevent 
further complications. 
 Fifth, the factors related to the 
external environment exert more pressure 
on ASEAN nowadays. Because the Asian 
crisis of 1997-1998, the Asian countries 
have realized the need to develop a 
common mechanism for achieving and 
maintaining economic stability and 
prevent future financial crises (Yean & 
Das, 2015, pp. 191). In addition, the crisis 
made countries realize that cooperation in 
both the real and financial spheres should 
grow together, and one of the conditions 
for achieving positive effects will be to 
ensure the free movement of skilled labor 
(Plummer, 2006, pp. 7). 
 Sixth, the competitive threat of 
China has become more significant. The 
accession of this country to the World 
Trade Organization resulted in the 
increase of its attractiveness as a place of 
investment and production location. 
ASEAN decided to strengthen internal 
cooperation to improve economies of scale 
resulting from the functioning of the 
domestic market and thus improve their 
position towards China.  
 The above-described factors made 
the ASEAN leaders consider the future of 
ASEAN. The experience of AFTA, the 
ASEAN Framework on Services and the 
ASEAN Investment Area, were positive 
and promising. However, they may not be 
enough to maintain a competitive 
advantage, and most of all, empowerment 
of the grouping in East Asia. Therefore, in 
2003 it was decided to deepen integration 
through the ASEAN Economic 
Community creation. The AEC was to be 
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the area with freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labor.
Scheme 1. The ASEAN Economic Community Milestones 
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Road to the ASEAN Economic 
Community 
The concept of the ASEAN 
Economic Community refers to the 1997 
ASEAN Vision 2020, a document adopted 
in December 1997 at the summit in Kuala 
Lumpur. It marked the integrating 
countries and their long-term direction of 
actions. By 2020, ASEAN was to become 
the community based on three pillars: 
1) ASEAN Security Community, 
2) ASEAN Economic Community and 
3) ASEAN Socio-cultural Community 
(Yean & Das, 2015, pp. 193). In October 
2003 at the ASEAN Summit in Bali, it was 
decided to introduce AEC 2020 (Bali 
Concord II) (ASEAN, 2008, pp. 5). The 
primary objective of the AEC was ‘to 
create a stable, prosperous and highly 
competitive ASEAN economic region in 
which there is a free flow of goods, 
services, investment and a freer flow of 
capital, equitable economic development 
and reduced poverty and socio-economic 
disparities in the year 2020' (Yean & Das, 
2015, p. 193). In January 2007 at the 
summit in Cebu, the assumed date of 
entry into force of the community was 
shortened by five years – the AEC was to 
be finalized by the end of 2015.  
 In November of 2007, an important 
decision was adopted regarding the 
introduction of a specific action plan with 
strategic steps in its implementation - the 
2007 AEC Blueprint. The Blueprint is 
organized according to the AEC’s four 
objectives: 1) Single Market and 
Production Base; 2) Competitive Economic 
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Region; 3) Equitable Economic 
Development; and 4) Integration Into 
Global Economy. Clearly defined 
objectives and a timetable for 
implementation were introduced. In 2015 
the formal establishment of the AEC was 
officially announced, but not all of its 
goals have been achieved. As a result, a 
new plan, which outlines the vision for 
AEC in the next decade (the AEC 
Blueprint 2025), was prepared (ASEAN, 
2015c). The AEC Blueprint 2025 is based 
and develops the AEC Blueprint 2015 and 
consists of five areas: 1) A Highly 
Integrated and Cohesive Economy; 2) A 
Competitive, Innovative, and Dynamic 
ASEAN; 3) Enhanced Connectivity and 
Sectoral Cooperation; 4) A Resilient, 
Inclusive, People-Oriented, and People-
Centered ASEAN; and 5) A Global 
ASEAN.  
Assumptions and progress in realizing of 
ASEAN Economic Community 
As already mentioned, the decision 
about the realization of the ASEAN 
Economic Community was taken during 
the 9th ASEAN Summit held in Bali in 
2003, but the concrete actions started in 
2007 when the AEC Blueprint was 
introduced. The AEC’s pillars and core 
elements are presented in table 1. 
What is unique is the fact that the 
AEC Blueprint 2015 set out measures and 
schedules for their implementation, that 
is, during four two-year periods: 2008-
2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013 and 2014-2015. 
The primary instrument of measuring the 
progress on the AEC implementation – 
The AEC Scorecard mechanism - was 
established in 2008. This is a self-
assessment tool that monitors the 
achievement of milestones that were 
indicated in the Economic Blueprint’s 
Strategic Schedule (Menon & Melendez, 
2015, pp. 1). In the first two periods of 
implementation of the community, the 
AEC Scorecards were published. In 
subsequent phases of implementation 
they were not. 
Information about implementation 
appears in different places and in an 
unorganized way. For example, after the 
26th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur 
held in April 2015, the chairman stated 
that the rate of implementation of the AEC 
Scorecard stands at 90.5% (458 out of 506 
measures) (ASEAN, 2015b, pp. 43). But the 
progress on the implementation rates for 
each pillar was missing. The same 
situation was observed in the ASEAN 
Annual Report 2013-2014 when it stated 
that by end-2013 81,7% of the 229 AEC 
prioritized key deliverables targeted by 
2013 have been implemented (ASEAN, 
2014, pp. 35).  
In the report on progress in the 
implementation of the AEC (ASEAN, 
2015a), the ASEAN Secretariat explained 
the changes that have occurred in the 
methodology of reporting progress 
towards the creation of the AEC. In 2012, 
at the 20th ASEAN summit adopted The 
Phnom Penh Agenda for ASEAN 
Community Building called for 
prioritizing high-impact activities and 
concrete, key measures to address the 
challenges and obstacles for realizing the 
AEC by 2015. As a result, two lists of 
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prioritized key deliverables (PKDs) were 
created – one for implementation by 2013 
and another for implementation by 2015. 
From mid-2013 through 2014 reports on 
the implementation of the AEC Scorecard 
focused on these PKDs. The Secretariat 
stated that the implementation of all, not 
only the priority instruments, was 
monitored continuously and presented to 
ASEAN sectoral bodies. It seems that the 
lack of information about the planned 
change has contributed to the lack of 
consistency of the analysis and the limited 
possibility of a comprehensive 
assessment. Below are the results of the 
AEC based on the information available. 
Table 2 presents detailed information on 
the implementation of the planned 
instruments in the first two phases (2008-
09 and 2010-11). 
Table 1. The 2015 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 
Pillar Core Elements 
A. Single Market and Production Base A1. Free flow of goods: 9 strategic approaches  
A2. Free flow of services: 3 strategic approaches  
A3. Free flow of investment: 5 strategic approaches  
A4. Freer flow of capital: 7 strategic approaches  
A5. Free flow of skilled labor  
A6. Priority integration sectors  
A7. Food, agriculture, and forestry 
B. Competitive Economic Region  
 
B1. Competition policy  
B2. Consumer protection  
B3. Intellectual property rights  
B4. Infrastructure development: 10 strategic approaches  
B5. Taxation  
B6. E-commerce 
C. Equitable Economic Development  
 
C1. Small and Medium-size Enterprises development  
C2. Initiative for ASEAN Integration 
D. Integration Into Global Economy  D1. Coherent approach toward external economic relations  
D2. Enhanced participation in global supply networks 
Source: (ASEAN, 2008, pp. 6–29).
The overall ratio for the two 
implementation periods listed in Table 2 
reached 67.5%. Achievements in key areas 
have contributed to the overall ratio: 
‘Single market and production base’ 
65.9%, ‘Competitive economic region’ 
67.9%, ‘Equitable economic development’ 
66.7% and ‘Integration into the global 
economy’ 85.7%. The largest number of 
fully implemented instruments concerned 
the area of ‘Single market and production 
base’ (114 instruments in phase I and II). 
This area was however given only a 65.9% 
rate of implementation, because 59 
instruments were not implemented, 
mainly in the area of services. In turn, the 
highest rate of implementation was 
observed in the area of ‘Integration into 
the global economy.’ In this case, 12 
instruments were implemented, while the 
number of not implemented instruments 
was 2. The relatively high number of 
implemented instruments occurred in the 
area of ‘Competitive Economic Region’ 
(53), but the same was true for 
instruments not implemented (25). This 
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provided the implementation rate of 
67.9%.  
 What is rather worrying from the 
point of view of an implementation of the 
ASEAN Economic Community is that the 
implementation of measures was losing 
momentum. This can be seen in Table 2 
when examining the indicators during 
different phases and areas.  
Table 2. The AEC Scorecard for Phase I and Phase II (2008-2011) 
Specification 
Phase I (2008-09) Phase II (2010-11) Total Measures 
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Single market and production base 
Free flow of goods 9 0 23 24 32 24 
Free flow of services 10 3 13 17 23 20 
Free flow of investment  5 1 5 8 10 9 
Freer flow of capital 1 0 5 0 6 0 
Free flow of skilled labor  . . 1 0 1 0 
Priority integration sectors  28 0 1 0 29 0 
Food, agriculture, and forestry 8 0 5 6 13 6 
Total number of measures 61 4 53 55 114 59 
Implementation rate 93,8% 6,2% 49,1% 50,9% 65,9% 34,1% 
Competitive economic region 
Competition policy 2 0 2 0 4 0 
Consumer protection 2 0 5 4 7 4 
Intellectual property rights . . 4 1 4 1 
Transport 15 10 6 8 21 18 
Energy 0 0 2 1 2 1 
Mineral 1 0 7 0 8 0 
ICT 2 0 4 0 6 0 
Taxation . . 0 1 0 1 
E-commerce . . 1 0 1 0 
Total number of measures 22 10 31 15 53 25 
Implementation rate 68,7% 31,3% 67,4% 32,6% 67,9% 32,1% 
Equitable economic development 
SME development 1 0 4 3 5 3 
IAI 2 0 1 1 3 1 
Total number of measures 3 0 5 4 8 4 
Implementation rate 100% 0% 55,5% 44,5% 66,7% 33,3% 
Integration into global economy 
External economic relations 5 0 7 2 12 2 
Total number of measures 5 0 7 2 12 2 
Implementation rate 100% 0% 78% 22% 85,7% 14,3% 
IAI – Initiative for ASEAN Integration 
Source: Own preparations based on (ASEAN, 2012). 
In ‘Single market and production 
base’ the indicator has declined from 
93.8% (2008-09) to 49.1% (2010-11)  in 
‘Competitive economic region’ from 68.7 
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to 67.4%, in ‘Equitable economic 
development’ from 100 to 55.5%, and in 
the area of ‘Integration into the global 
economy’ from 100 to 78%.  It seems that 
this situation resulted from the exhaustion 
of the ability to easily achieve the 
objectives. Initially, the easiest measures 
and indicators were implemented. Later, 
along with the more difficult changes, 
implementation indicators deteriorated. 
This was not an optimistic situation from 
the point of view of the subsequent stages 
of integration. Perhaps, the deterioration 
of the indicators has changed along with 
the way of presenting integration 
achievements. 
Figure 1. ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard Key Deliverables, January 2008-March 
2013 
Source: (Menon & Melendez, 2015, p. 2).
A further complication was the 
expansion of the list of measures included 
in the AEC Scorecard. Initially, 316 such 
measures were identified, however, with 
the passage of time and updates to the 
agenda, their number increased to 611 (as 
of October 2016). The presentation of 
achievements took an aggregated form for 
the entire period and selected priority 
areas. One such presentation is shown in 
Figure 1, depicting the AEC Scorecard Key 
Deliverables for the period January 2008-
March 2013. According to data from  
Figure 1, the overall level of 
implementation of the planned measures 
In turn, the highest level of 
implementation occurred in the area of 
‘Equitable economic development,’ 
reaching 77.8%, and then ‘Single market 
and production base’ (77.2%). 
Unfortunately, as data is aggregated, one 
cannot discern the reasons for this level of 
implementation of measures in different 
areas. 
Similarly, aggregated data were 
made public in 2015, while they relate to 
the period from January 2008 to the end of 
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October 2015 and another group of 
measures. In the last year before the 
formal establishment of the AEC, an 
overview of not implemented Prioritized 
Key Deliverables was prepared. Based on 
the evaluation of their implementation 
possibilities by the end of 2015 and on 
their importance for the trade 
development, 54 measures were selected 
(high-priority measures – HPMs). 
Together with the measures implemented 
since 2008, HPMs form a group of 506 
measures to monitor the implementation 
of the AEC (ASEAN, 2015a, pp. 9). 
Figure 2 shows fully implemented 
ASEAN-wide and high-priority measures 
by the AEC Pillar for the period January 
2008 – October 2015. 
Figure 2. Fully Implemented ASEAN-wide and high-priority measures by the AEC Pillar, 
2008-2015, in %, as at 31 October 2015
 
Source: (ASEAN, 2015a, pp. 9).
According to data presented in 
Figure 2, the change in the number of 
measures under consideration has 
increased the overall rate of 
implementation in priority areas up to 
92.7%.1 In the ‘Single market and 
production base’ 256 measures were 
implemented (92.4%), while the number of 
not fully implemented was 21 (7.6%). On 
the other hand, in ‘Competitive Economic 
                                                          
1 When all the instruments declared earlier 
(611 in total) are considered, the 
implementation rate decreases to 79.5%, or 486 
measures (ASEAN, 2015a, p. 10). 
Region’s 154 measures were implemented 
(90.5%) and 16 not implemented (9.5%). 
The other two fields were claimed to be 
fully implemented (ratio implementation 
was 100% in both cases). 
 An assessment of the degree of 
implementation of the AEC solely on the 
AEC Scorecard is subject to the risk of 
error (Menon & Melendez, 2015, pp. 2–3). 
First, there is no certainty whether the 
AEC Blueprint covers all needed measures 
so that the establishment of the common 
market could be possible. Second, as the 
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AEC Scorecard is a compliance tool that 
relies on self-assessment, there could be a 
willingness to give overestimated 
compliance and achievement (Jones, 2016, 
pp. 648). Third, the AEC Scorecard 
measures the aggregate process, and it 
does not take into account differences 
within individual countries. Fourth, the 
scorecard fails to capture differences in 
speeds of liberalization among member 
states fully. Fifth, the AEC does not 
analyze and explain results. Sixth, there is 
no efficient mechanism for exerting peer 
pressure on member states when the AEC 
targets are missed. 
 Taking into account the above, it is 
worth taking a closer look at the most 
crucial achievement of the ASEAN 
member countries in their quest to 
establish the ASEAN Economic 
Community. The most critical areas 
developed in the AEC Blueprint 2015 will 
be explored. The primary sources of 
information are documents such as: 
(ASEAN, 2015d), (ASEAN, 2015b), 
(ASEAN, 2014), (Menon & Melendez, 
2015), (Chia, 2013). 
Pillar 1. Single Market and Production 
Base 
Pillar 1 is the most critical element 
of the AEC. It includes items such as: free 
flow of goods, free flow of services, free 
flow of investments, free flow of capital 
and free flow of skilled labor. The most 
significant achievement in the area of free 
flow of goods is a reduction of tariffs 
among members. In 2014, the average 
ATIGA rate for all ASEAN member states 
stood at the level of 0,54%, while MFN 
average at the level of 6,9%. For ASEAN-6 
tariffs have fallen to virtually zero, while 
for other countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar and Viet Nam - CLMV) have 
been declining up to their planned 
elimination in 2018 (ASEAN, 2015d). 
According to Menon and Melendez (2015, 
p. 5) the progress was possible as 
achievements in Pillar 1 relate to ‘low 
hanging fruit.’ More sensitive areas of 
reforms remain – such as opening up the 
agriculture sector, steel, and motor 
vehicles. What is characteristic and not 
necessarily good for the assessment of the 
ASEAN free flow of goods, is the fact that 
utilization of the common effective 
preferential tariffs has been relatively low. 
There are some reasons behind this: 
difficulties complying with rules of origin 
(because of the high level of product 
fragmentation in the region, high import 
content of major export products, 
administrative costs of proving origin); 
lack of progress in reducing non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) to intra-ASEAN trade. 
 Services market integration in the 
ASEAN is conducted under the 1995 
ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Services (AFAS). Nine packages of 
commitments under AFAS have been 
concluded. Even though AFAS 
commitments have improved over time, 
liberalization in services was hampered by 
flexibilities introduced in the ‘ASEAN-X’ 
formula. This formula allows member 
states to liberalize according to each 
country’s readiness – this is one of the 
barriers in progress of liberalization 
process. 
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 ‘Free flow of Investment and 
Capital’ is one of the most important goals 
of the AEC. In the AFTA one of the key 
objectives was to remove barriers to trade 
to attract foreign direct investment in 
regional production networks. In 1998 the 
ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) was 
established. While it was to facilitate FDI 
inflows, the scope of the AIA placed too 
much emphasis on intra-regional FDI. It 
granted national treatment to ASEAN 
investors by 2010 and to non-ASEAN 
investors by 2020 (Chia, 2013, pp. 20). The 
full realization of the AIA was advanced 
to 2010 for ASEAN-6 and 2015 for CLMV. 
In 2012 the ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement came into effect 
and superseded the earlier agreement 
(Yean & Das, 2015, pp. 195). The initiative 
is seen as a way toward enabling the most 
important investors (external as the EU, 
the US, China etc.) to be treated equally to 
national enterprises. The ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
offers investment liberalization, 
investment facilitation, investment 
protection and investment promotion. 
 The AEC Blueprint stated that 
strategic actions for a free flow of skilled 
labor are: facilitating the issuance of visas 
and employment passes, MRAs for major 
professional services, core concordance of 
services skills and qualifications. Mutual 
Recognition Arrangements are one of the 
most important instruments for skilled 
labor mobility in ASEAN. By date the 
MRAs were concluded for (ASEAN, 
2015a, pp. 33): 1) Engineering Services 
(2005); 2) Nursing Services (2006), 
Architectural Services (2007); A 
framework for Surveying Qualifications 
(2007); Medical Practitioners (2009); 
Dental Practitioners (2009); A framework 
for Accounting Services (2009) replaced by 
MRA on Accountancy Services (2014) and 
Tourism Professional (2012). Although 
some actions and initiatives were 
introduced, the majority of labor flows 
occurs independently of these 
arrangements and is market-driven. Quite 
the opposite of assumptions, the 
overwhelming share of labor flows within 
ASEAN is in low- and semi-skilled labor. 
Pillar 2. Competitive Economic Region 
The second pillar of the AEC 
comprises such areas (among others) as: 
competition policy, intellectual property 
rights protection, consumer protection 
and infrastructure development (see 
table 1). Activities undertaken in all these 
areas lead to lowering production and 
transaction costs, encouraging more 
efficient allocation of resources and 
improving consumer welfare. Business 
climate improvements attract more FDI 
inflows. Several initiatives for competition 
policy were introduced in ASEAN such as 
a formation of the ASEAN Expert’s Group 
on Competition (2007), ASEAN Regional 
Guidelines on Competition Policy, 
Handbook on Competition Policy and 
Laws in ASEAN for Business. According 
to Menon and Melendez (2015, pp. 9), five 
ASEAN member states have 
comprehensive competition policies and 
laws, while the others were working on 
the introduction of competition policy and 
law by 2015. 
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 In the field of Intellectual Property 
Rights, some actions have been 
undertaken. For instance, the ASEAN 
Working Group on Intellectual Property 
Cooperation (established in 1996) was to 
assess the implementation of the ASEAN 
IPR Action Plan 2011-2015. Additionally, 
the Task Force on Trade Mark has been 
established to complete the Trade Marks 
related action lines by 2015. It seems that 
competition policy and intellectual 
property rights protections are sensitive 
areas of the ASEAN integration. Although 
the Blueprint mentions a commitment to 
integrate the regional economy, 
competition policy and IPR protection are 
national in application. Keeping in mind 
the differentiated level of development of 
the ASEAN member states, it does not 
appear that full uniformity in competition 
and IPR rules is possible soon. 
 Developments in physical and 
telecommunication infrastructure took 
place in ASEAN, but there is a lot to be 
done. The main problem is to coordinate 
different national needs with the regional 
vision and plans. Another issue is a huge 
need for financing. In ASEAN the 
wealthiest countries are the smallest, so 
there is a necessity to use different 
methods and sources for infrastructure 
development. Even if there are gains in 
infrastructure development, this can be 
challenged in the area of transport 
liberalization. 
Pillar 3. Equitable Economic 
Development 
 The Third Pillar of the AEC 
Blueprint 2015 aims to address issues 
connected to intra-country development 
gaps and the development gap between 
ASEAN-6 and CLMV. Measures foreseen 
in the Blueprint consist of SME 
development and Initiative for ASEAN 
Integration (IAI). Under the Strategic 
Action Plan for ASEAN SME 
Development (2010-2015) a few projects 
have been realized: the ASEAN Business 
Incubator Network, the ASEAN SME 
Guidebook towards the AEC 2015, 
ASEAN Online SME Academy. The IAI 
was invented to be a framework for 
regional co-operation where more 
advanced (richer) member states could 
contribute resources and expertise to the 
less developed ones. 
Pillar 4. Integration into the Global 
Economy 
In the fourth pillar of the AEC 
Blueprint, we can see the most significant 
progress. Multilateral and unilateral 
actions taken by ASEAN countries have 
led to a reduction of trade barriers in 
goods, services as well as investments. 
This has made the ASEAN one of the most 
open regions in the world economy 
(Menon & Melendez, 2015, pp. 12). On the 
other hand, since 2000 there is a 
proliferation of FTAs among ASEAN 
member states. However, these FTAs deal 
solely with tariffs and do not address 
regulatory and other non-tariff barriers 
such as product standards, services, 
investments, intellectual property rights, 
government procurement and movement 
of business people. ASEAN's FTAs are not 
supportive of regional economic 
integration; they create many problems, 
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usually described as the ‘spaghetti bowl.’ 
One of the examples is the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) which started to be negotiated in 
2012. The ASEAN negotiates with six 
other countries (Australia, China, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, India and New 
Zealand), but the partnership will add to, 
rather than replace, existing ASEAN+1 
FTAs. The RCEP also uses the ‘flexibility’ 
clause, which allows the inclusion of 
provisions for special and differential 
treatment and some provision for lesser 
developed countries. Differences in the 
detailed provisions of individual FTAs are 
another point of concern. For instance, 
rules of origin provisions can vary 
significantly from agreement to 
agreement. This elevates the level of 
difficulty in harmonizing agreements. 
This has not mentioned the negotiation of 
interregional agreements by individual 
member countries instead of the whole 
ASEAN such as agreements of Singapore 
and Viet Nam with the EU (Mazur, 2017). 
 The above-presented assumptions 
and achievements of the implementation 
of the ASEAN Economic Community 
allow for some assertions. The analysis of 
the various areas of integration shows that 
there is still much to be done. If the 
implementation of the AEC is measured 
by the implementation of the planned 
actions and activities, the AEC has not 
fulfilled its objectives (i.e., the culmination 
of the process by the end of 2015). Many 
authors emphasize, however, that the aim 
of the establishment of the AEC should be 
considered as a milestone, not as an end of 
the process. If economic integration in 
ASEAN is to develop, this approach 
seems appropriate. 
Possible effects and problematic issues 
of the process 
Potential impact on the growth of 
wealth as a result of the establishment of 
the ASEAN Economic Community has 
been the subject of research, and the 
results have been presented in several 
publications. According to a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model 
presented by Plummer and Chia (2009), an 
additional increase of wealth as a result of 
the realization of the AEC would amount 
to 5.3 percentage points (Chia, 2013, p. 12). 
All member states would benefit from 
that, but Singapore would benefit the 
most (9.7 p. p.), together with Brunei 
Darussalam (7.0) and Cambodia (6.3). The 
lowest gains would be attributed to Viet 
Nam (2.8) and Malaysia (3.0).  
 Other estimates prepared by the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN 
and East Asia (ERIA) show that the effect 
of GDP growth as a result of tariff 
reductions would be small, but the most 
substantial impact would be from the 
reduction of barriers in the services sector 
and time savings associated with the 
introduction of trade facilitation and 
infrastructure improvement (Chia, 2013, 
pp. 12). In 2014, the Asian Development 
Bank together with the International 
Labor Organization conducted a study 
that showed that the full implementation 
of the AEC Blueprint 2015 would lead to 
an increase in regional GDP by 7.1% and 
create 14 million additional jobs by 2025 
(ILO-ADB, 2014, pp. 39, 52). In most cases, 
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this would include less economically 
developed ASEAN countries. 
 In turn, the McKinsey Global 
Institute in its report states that the 
introduction of the AEC could cause a 
shift of global manufacturing from China 
toward the ASEAN. As a result, by 2030, 
annual GDP for the entire grouping could 
increase from 280 to 615 billion USD, 
which would represent 5 to 12% of 
ASEAN's GDP in 2030 (Woetzel, Tonby, 
Thompson, Burtt, & Lee, 2014, pp. 4). 
 The estimates presented above are 
subject to an error resulting from 
theoretical assumptions. However, they 
all show the benefits ASEAN could gain 
as a result of the AEC. However, those 
benefits are not guaranteed. On the 
contrary, they can be hard to achieve. So 
far, it is said, that the AEC brought fewer 
benefits than had been expected. This is 
because there are some problems ASEAN 
faces. According to K. Sakane (2018, pp. 
12–13), there are several significant 
obstacles to the AEC development, 
namely: still existing domestic non-tariff 
barriers; regulatory frameworks on 
transport facilitation (even if physical 
infrastructure developed); low integration 
of service sector in the region; difficulties 
with implementation of free flow of 
skilled labor; little progress of capital 
market integration. According to 
K. Sakane, due to these obstacles, the AEC 
is far behind the EU. 
 M. G. Plummer (2006) compared 
the creation of the AEC with the 
experiences of the European Union. He 
pointed out certain similarities and 
differences that can be summarized in a 
few points. First, the institutional 
environment in ASEAN is now much 
different from that of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in the 1950s. 
The political and social motivations for 
economic integration in Europe were far 
different from ASEAN's today. 
Institutional development in the ASEAN 
is difficult as: 1) nation-state formation 
was much later than in the European 
context; 2) divergence in socio-political 
institutions is larger than in Europe; 
3) European institutions are successful in 
economic-related matters; 4) European 
institutions are rather costly and ASEAN’s 
budget much smaller. Second, the 
international economic environment is far 
different nowadays than in the 1950s. The 
global marketplace is much more open 
nowadays. This means that the current 
cost of the diversion effect resulting from 
the integration is significantly higher than 
in the past. Third, ASEAN faces much 
greater internal economic diversification. 
This results in the fact that the possibility 
of implementation of the AEC will be 
more complicated and difficult. Even the 
possibility of taking into account all the 
countries in the process will be difficult. 
This is expressed in the 'flexibility' 
approach, the example of which is the 
inclusion of ASEAN-X rules in the 
liberalization of services. Fourth, ASEAN 
is now much more open than the EEC was 
in the 1950s. 
 These different conditions make it 
impossible to transfer the European 
experience directly to the Asian theater. 
Nevertheless, there are some experiences 
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of European integration, which ASEAN 
can learn from. Firstly, ASEAN should not 
solely focus on the internal market and 
pursue a policy of inward-looking 
discrimination. This would be particularly 
disadvantageous, keeping in mind that as 
many as 75% of the total of ASEAN’s 
trade is directed outwardly. Secondly, the 
example of EEC/EU shows that trade and 
investment are strictly interconnected 
with the change of the economies’ 
structures. This is also the case for 
ASEAN. Thirdly, the European Union has 
gained from internal trade liberalization. 
The creation of a customs union and a 
single market was important because it 
led to the reduction of transaction costs. 
This resulted in a more efficient 
international division of labor in most of 
EU’s member states. ASEAN should focus 
on creating not only the internal market 
but on the creation of global economic 
relations. 
Prospects of the ASEAN Economic 
Community 
Most observers of integration 
processes in ASEAN have realized that the 
formal establishment of the ASEAN 
Economic Community in 2015 does not 
end the integration process. What is more, 
they treat the AEC as a milestone towards 
further integration. Also, decision-makers 
in the ASEAN realize that there is still a 
lot to do. All this resulted in the adoption 
of the new plan – the ASEAN Economic 
Community Blueprint 2025 (ASEAN, 
2015c). The document states that the 
overall vision articulated in the AEC 
Blueprint 2015 remains relevant. The new 
Blueprint builds on the AEC Blueprint 
2015. The priority is to complete the 
unfinished Implementation of Measures 
under the AEC Blueprint 2015 by end-
2016. As the Blueprint states, in the next 
decade, ASEAN will also provide a new 
emphasis on the development and 
promotion of micro, small and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs) in its economic 
integration efforts (Bobowski, 2017). At 
the same time, ASEAN will likewise 
embrace the evolving digital technology 
as the leverage to enhance trade and 
investments, provide an e-based business 
platform, promote good governance and 
facilitate the use of green technology. For 
the monitoring and assessment of The 
AEC Blueprint 2025 implementation, The 
AEC 2025 Monitoring and Evaluation 
(M&E) Framework was introduced 
(ASEAN, 2018).2 
 It should be remembered that the 
creation of formal plans is not sufficient to 
achieve real economic integration. It is 
necessary to convince the member states 
about the benefits that result from the 
deepening of integration and get their 
commitment. Sizeable internal diversity, 
conflict of interest and the Asian style of 
discussion can be reasons opposing a 
statement that economic integration 
within ASEAN will develop 
systematically. On the other hand, it 
shows that determining a particular date 
(2015, 2025) is mobilizing for (some) 
member states. Without such fixed date 
                                                          
2 Due to difficulties in data gathering, the 
evaluation of the implementation of The AEC 
Blueprint 2025 will be of interest to the author 
in the future research.  
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progress in the economic integration of 
ASEAN would be far lower. 
Conclusion 
At the end of 2015, the creation of 
the AEC was announced. Although the 
comparison with the Single European 
Market was automatically imposed, it is 
not entirely appropriate. The AEC is not a 
typical common market with features as 
pointed out in theory nor it is similar with 
that in the European Union. In ASEAN, a 
model called 'common market minus' is 
implemented. Moreover, in the integration 
process in ASEAN, it was decided to 
bypass the customs union as an 
intermediate form between the free trade 
area and the common market. 
 ASEAN realizes that deeper 
integration is needed, but because 
conditions are different, it uses other 
methods of intensifying cooperation. 
 Firstly, the much higher than in 
Europe diversity between countries (e.g., 
economic, political, religious, cultural, 
linguistic) causes that ASEAN Way is 
perhaps a reasonable strategy used in 
negotiations. However, it affects the 
effects of integration, its dynamics, and 
scope negatively. ASEAN countries are 
sensitive to even small attempts to limit 
their sovereignty, so they do not show a 
willingness to transfer of national 
competences (this is why there is no 
customs union because here it would be 
necessary to conduct at least a common 
external tariff). National interests are more 
important than those of the community, 
which means that integration is uneven. 
This is confirmed by data showing the 
stages of the AEC implementation. After a 
relatively good beginning, the following 
years brought a weakening of the 
dynamics of change. This is probably the 
effect of 'low hanging fruits.' It is currently 
more difficult to implement increasingly 
advanced integration tasks. The effects of 
AEC are lower than assumed because 
barriers still exist. The lack of fulfillment 
of the conditions of the common market 
results in lower effects than expected in 
theory (lack of free flow of labor causes 
suboptimal allocation of production 
factors, which limits the increase in their 
productivity). 
 Secondly, integration within the 
AEC is carried out under different 
external conditions. If ¾ ASEAN trade is 
realized with third countries, it is difficult 
to expect strong promotion of internal 
integration, excluding third countries 
from the market. This would involve high 
costs of the trade diversion, especially 
under conditions of high dependence of 
ASEAN countries on the Chinese market. 
 To conclude, it can be said that the 
ASEAN Economic Community is an 
interesting initiative undertaken by 
ASEAN, however, different from the 
classic common market and the Single 
European Market. It is good that the 
initiative was formulated and 
implemented, but at the moment it is 
difficult to determine its effects reliably. 
This will be possible only in the future, 
and it will be of interest to the author of 
this study. 
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